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This paper investigates the factors that facilitate the diffusion of international norms to 
the domestic agenda, focusing on United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on 
Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). The inclusion of women in peace and security institutions 
results in increased state stability and human rights compliance, yet over half of all UN member 
states have not created National Action Plans (NAPs) to implement UNSCR 1325. The present 
study quantitatively tests the hypothesis that countries with higher levels of gender inequality are 
less likely to have NAPs compared to countries with lower levels of gender inequality. The 
analysis also included democratization and international embeddedness as control variables. 
Results revealed that the relationship between gender inequality and NAP creation in 2018 is 
statistically insignificant, but this insignificance could be explained by the norm lifecycle model. 
Furthermore, results support the hypothesis that democratization significantly increases the 
likelihood that a NAP will be created. Though this offers important insight to WPS practitioners, 
using democratization initiatives to promote NAP creation risks subverting the goals and 
priorities of the WPS agenda in favor of broader human rights discourse.  
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Resolution 1325 —passed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2000— 
promotes the inclusion and representation of women within peace and security institutions 
around the world. As of October 2019, there are 13 additional UNSC resolutions that make up 
the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.1 UN member states implement this agenda by 
creating National Action Plans (NAPs), of which there are currently 89— only 46% of the total 
193 UN member states.2 Understanding why some countries comply while others do not will 
provide insight into how the norm of NAP creation is diffusing and in what ways implementation 
may be inconsistent in the years to come. The WPS agenda is particularly important because it 
has broader implications than just women’s rights; it also focuses on strengthening peace 
agreements, reducing sexual- and gender-based violence, increasing state stability, and 
improving the quality of humanitarian disaster relief. This paper aims to quantitatively answer 
how gender inequality affects the creation of UNSCR 1325 NAPs, hypothesizing that countries 
with higher rates of gender inequality are less likely to have a NAP.  
Literature Review 
This literature review will provide an overview of the concepts surrounding international 
norm diffusion and compliance, which in this case is indicated by creation of UNSCR 1325 
NAPs. The first section will briefly discuss the role and debate surrounding NAPs as a medium 
for norm diffusion. The next section will outline the advantages of using the constructivist model 
 
1 “UN Documents for Women, Peace and Security: Security Council Resolutions.” Security Council Report, 2021. 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-
resolutions/?ctype=Women%2C+Peace+and+Security&cbtype=women-peace-and-security.  








of norm lifecycles to study norm diffusion, followed by an analysis of empirical trends in state 
compliance with gender rights norms, including recent data on UNSCR 1325 compliance. 
Finally, the literature review will conclude by identifying gaps in the existing literature and how 
the present research will advance scholarly knowledge on the diffusion of the WPS agenda.  
  Most empirical findings cited in this review were derived from qualitative studies that 
considered domestic factors that may be important for norm diffusion, though few studied 
UNSCR 1325. This study assumes that anti-human trafficking norms, women’s suffrage, gender 
quotas, and gender mainstreaming are separate issues, which limits the possibilities of 
comparison. However, gender rights norms and agreements may be underpinned by similar 
values, allowing for a comparison of variables that predict norm compliance.3 Furthermore, 
drawing from lateral literature presents an opportunity to apply credible methods and findings on 
norm tipping points to the case of UNSCR 1325. Very little research has been conducted on 
which factors have led to the adoption or non-adoption of NAPs, so using findings from related 
fields can advance knowledge about this topic. 
The Content and Role of NAPs 
NAPs are the international standard for the diffusion of the women, peace, and security 
agenda among states.4 Generally, NAPs reference the four pillars of Resolution 1325: 
participation, protection, prevention, and resolution and recovery.5 The first pillar, participation, 
promotes the inclusion of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The second pillar, 
protection, emphasizes the gendered experience of war and the need for states to protect women 
 
3 True, Jacqui. “Explaining the Global Diffusion of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.” International 
Political Science Review 37, no. 3 (2016): 314. 
4 Kirby, Paul and Laura J. Shepherd. “Women, Peace, and Security: Mapping the (Re)Production of a Policy 
Ecosystem.” Journal of Global Security Studies (2020): 2-3. 





from sexual and gender-based violence during conflict and instability. The third pillar, 
prevention, encourages states to take legal action to reduce the likelihood of gender-based 
violence, while the fourth pillar, resolution and recovery, promotes the inclusion of women and 
gendered perspectives in post-conflict reconstruction.  
States are not the sole authors of NAPs. Governments usually consult civil society 
organizations on local issues and perspectives while creating NAPs.6 Therefore, NAPs also 
include themes and topics that are relevant to local experiences and national goals; some of these 
topics include the Responsibility to Protect, natural disasters, refugees, and education.7 While 
some scholars criticize such NAPs for not strictly following the Resolution 1325 framework, 
other scholars view “localization” as an innovative way to adapt international agreements to a 
country’s history, culture, and objectives.8 Nevertheless, scholars have noted that developing 
countries usually format their NAPs according to Western NAPs, which are in turn criticized for 
being too narrow and outward oriented. Western NAPs tend to over-emphasize the pillar of 
protection, focusing on the protection of women in other countries and avoiding internal 
reforms.9  
More broadly, NAPs are limited when it comes to accountability and implementation. 
There is no international enforcement or monitoring mechanism for ensuring the passage and 
implementation of NAPs at the national level. There is a general lack of disaggregated data 
regarding women’s participation and experience in conflict and political decision-making, and it 
 
6 Hamilton, Caitlin, Nyibeny Naam, and Laura J. Shepherd. Twenty Years of Women, Peace and Security National 
Action Plans: Analysis and Lessons Learned: University of Sydney, 2020, 70. 
7 Drumond, Paula and Tamya Rebelo. "Global Pathways Or Local Spins? National Action Plans in South America." 
Null 22, no. 4 (2020): 477. 
8 Drumond and Rebelo, “Global Pathways,” 468; Larsen, Zan. "Benefits of a National Action Plan (NAP) to 
Implement UNSCR 1325 for the U.S." Women's Policy Journal of Harvard 9 (2012): 40.  





is difficult to change cultural bias and practices through national policies.10 Some scholars posit 
that that states enact NAPs to justify intervention in other countries or to advance the success of 
some other ongoing mission.11 In this case, NAPs are more rhetorical than meaningful. Even 
when countries create NAPs that align closely with Resolution 1325, implementation is 
extremely difficult; for example, there is a significant difference between increasing the quantity 
of participating women in an institution versus the quality of their participation. Sometimes, 
governments do not have the resources or expertise to enact the policies they include in their 
NAP.12  
 Finally, even though the international community promotes NAPs for advancing the WPS 
agenda, there are policy options outside of NAPs that also advance the norm. Other policies and 
initiatives, such as national paid maternity leave or political representation quotas, can be 
implemented without a NAP.13 Yet, many scholars have hypothesized that countries that are 
likely to create such policies are also likely to create a NAP, so NAPs and non-NAP policies may 
be interrelated. Non-NAP WPS policies should decrease domestic gender inequality, creating 
preconditions for domestic political support of a NAP. While non-NAP policies are not 
accounted for in this study, it is expected that low levels of gender inequality are at least partially 
the result of such policies, increasing the likelihood of state compliance with Resolution 1325. 
Nevertheless, NAPs are the standard measurement of compliance with the international 
agreement, which is the focus of this study. 
 
10 Cabrera-Balleza, Mavic. "It is Time to Walk the Talk and Fulfill the Promise of UNSCR 1325." Palestine-Israel 
Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture 17, no. 3 (2011): 17. 
11 Kirby and Shepherd, “Women, Peace,” 6. 
12 Bjørvik, Oda Marie Sverdstad. "The Role and Effectiveness of National Action Plans as Soft Law Tools to 
Implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security." PhdD Diss., 
(University of Oslo, 2017): 39. 





Creating Compliance: Constructivist Models of Norm Diffusion 
Researchers studying norm diffusion commonly use constructivist paradigms. While 
realist and liberal approaches have contributed valuable insight to this field, both schools 
emphasize a certain level of deliberate state rationality that does not adequately account for the 
influence of non-state actors in the formation of norms. Non-state actors are important to 
consider in this regard because of the impact that activist networks can have on domestic 
political agendas. Constructivist models account for both domestic and international factors in 
their explanations of norm diffusion. This approach also accounts for cultural variation, which is 
attractive to scholars studying norm compliance, since domestic values help shape the 
operational environment for international norms. 
There are three prevalent constructivist models for considering norm diffusion. The 
universal model views international norms as exogenous to local experience yet universally 
applicable to all states.14 Dominant states and organizations create the norm internationally then 
coerce, persuade, and socialize other countries to adopt it.15 Alternatively, the boomerang model 
emphasizes the influence of transnational activist networks in shaping global norms for local 
implementation.16 A norm may diffuse to a society through activist networks, even if the state 
initially ignores its implementation on a national level. States are more likely to implement an 
international norm if there is already a domestic equivalent, or a “cultural match.”17 For example, 
norms rooted in democratic values are more likely to be implemented in countries where 
 
14 Krook, Mona Lena and Jacqui True. "Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The United Nations and 
the Global Promotion of Gender Equality." European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (2012): 106-107.  
15 Goodman, Ryan and Derek Jinks. "How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights 
Law." Duke Law Journal 54, no. 3 (2004): 621-703.  
16 Krook and True, “Rethinking the Life Cycles,” 107. 
17 Cortell, Andrew P. and James W. Davis. "Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A 





democracy is already practiced.18 Like the first model, this model emphasizes only one active 
party in norm diffusion. 
The norm life cycle model addresses the shortfalls of these models by providing a 
framework for comparing the influence of multiple actors during norm creation and diffusion. 
Finnemore and Sikkink posit that norm life cycles occur in three phases.19 First, norms are 
introduced to the international community. Then, they are adopted at the national level by states, 
international organizations, and activist networks. Finally, norms are internalized by domestic 
laws, policies, and professionals.20 Several parties underpin each stage of this process, including 
international actors from the universal model as well as activist networks from the boomerang 
model.21 Such flexibility reflects the complex environment from which norms emerge, and it 
accounts for the many mechanisms and actors that interact during norm creation. 
The second stage of the norm life cycle is the most important for analyzing why certain 
states adopt a norm while others do not. This stage is known as the “norm cascade,” which leads 
to a “tipping point” of widespread norm adoption beyond the initial core group of states.22 There 
are many types of interactions that lead to norm adoption. Some states adopt the norm once they 
are socialized by the behavior of other states. Socialization, or acculturation, is “the general 
process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.”23 
Some researchers have also put forth that norm adoption occurs when states are shamed or 
 
18 True,“Explaining the Global,” 313. 
19 Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917. 
20 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm,” 898.  
21 Krook and True, “Rethinking the Life Cycles,” 105. 
22 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm,” 898. 





shunned by influential actors.24 Pressure to assimilate can also manifest at multilateral, bilateral, 
and domestic levels as state and non-state actors threaten a state’s reputation through public 
judgment.25 Often, the tipping point is reached when many of these mechanisms converge. 
Other scholars have criticized the norm life cycle approach for being more descriptive 
than predictive since it depends on context rather than timeless theory.26 The norm life cycle 
model is also reliant on sociological principles, and those principles may not always explain state 
behavior; UNSCR 1325 reportedly reached its tipping point in 2010, yet less than half UN 
member states have internalized the norm.27 Krook and True view the norm life cycle model as 
too linear, treating norms and state preferences as separate and fixed.28 Similarly, Kirby and 
Shephard emphasize that the WPS norm changes every time a country or international actor 
publishes a related document with different terminology.29 Even so, this literature accepts the 
norm life cycle model as an intellectual framework for analyzing the conditions that characterize 
the so-called tipping point. It provides structure for examining a specific point in time rather than 
the substantive evolution of the norm, which is appropriate for the scope of this paper. 
 From Theory to Practice: Empirical Predictors of Norm Compliance 
Many scholars studying gender equality norms have attempted to determine the factors 
that predict country norm adoption. These factors can be broadly categorized into international 
group dynamics and domestic drivers, which are not always entirely distinct. For example, 
 
24Goodman and Jinks, “How to Influence,” 640-641; Krook and True, “Rethinking the Life Cycles”; Finnemore and 
Sikkink, “International Norm,” 895-896. 
25 Tryggestad, Torunn L. "International Norms and Political Change: "Women, Peace and Security" and the UN 
Security Agenda." University of Oslo, 2014: 59; Zwingel, Susanne. “How do Norms Travel? Theorizing 
International Women’s Rights in Transnational Perspectives.” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2012): 124; 
26 Keohane, Robert O. "International Institutions: Two Approaches." International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 
(1988): 379-396. 
27 Tryggestad, “International Norms,” 59; Kirby and Shepherd,“Women, Peace.”  
28 Krook and True, “Rethinking the Life Cycles,” 108-109. 





activist networks are often domestic since they operate within states, but they can also be 
transnational through their connection to the UN. Understanding the mechanisms of norm 
diffusion is important because it “helps us to ascertain the prospects for the further diffusion of 
WPS frameworks in national and regional governance.”30 It can also support the efforts of 
relevant WPS leaders, academics, and donor governments interested in promoting further NAP 
creation by revealing shortfalls and obstacles in NAP creation so far. 
International Group Dynamics 
International groups can influence state behavior in several ways. First, Kelley argues 
that groups and states use scorecard diplomacy by taking advantage of public judgment to 
damage the reputation of states and pressure them to change their behavior. One example is the 
US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report, which gives grades to states based on their 
efforts to stop human trafficking.31 NATO also created a scorecard to grade its members on their 
implementation of UNSCR 1325.32 However, the effects of this scorecard are unclear since most 
NATO members already had a NAP when the scorecard was released. Additionally, unlike the 
annual Trafficking in Persons Report, the NATO scorecard has been published only once, 
suggesting a lower level of pressure from the organization on its members. This could further 
indicate the importance of institutional commitment to a norm before members can be pressured 
to change. 
A second mechanism that affects state behavior is acculturation, demonstrated by the 
influence of developed countries on the formation of NAPs in developing countries. NAPs in 
 
30 True, “Explaining the Global,” 319. 
31 Kelley, Judith Green. Scorecard Diplomacy: Grading States to Influence their Reputation and Behavior. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017: 44-61. 






developing countries are mainly funded by Official Development Assistance from Western 
countries.33 Therefore, relationships with developed countries increase the likelihood that 
developing countries will create NAPs. True found that states are more likely to implement 
NAPs when they belong to a multilateral group that has a regional action plan, such as NATO or 
the African Union.34 An inverse example is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), which does not have a regional action plan and includes only two member states with 
a NAP, the Philippines and Indonesia.35 Davies, Nackers, and Teitt found that the cultural and 
organizational norms of ASEAN most likely reduced national motivations to create NAPs. 
Acculturation may change the ASEAN orientation toward WPS as Western actors like the UN, 
Australia, the US, and Canada continue to influence ASEAN to create a regional action plan of 
its own.36 Countries tend to adopt norms that increase their legitimacy within the groups to which 
they belong, and outside influence can change a group’s values and priorities. 
Finally, countries implement gender equality norms to gain membership in exclusive 
groups that value those norms.37 During its campaign for a seat on the UNSC, Australia 
promoted itself as a WPS leader and global example for implementing UNSCR 1325.38 
However, membership on the UNSC is not predictive of NAP adoption, which suggests that 
 
33 Bjørvik, Oda Marie Sverdstad. "The Role and Effectiveness of National Action Plans as Soft Law Tools to 
Implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security." PhdD Diss., 
(University of Oslo, 2017).  
34 True, “Explaining the Global.” 
35 Davies, Sara E., Kimberly Nackers, and Sarah Teitt. "Women, Peace and Security as an ASEAN 
Priority." Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 3 (2014): 334. 
36 Vietnam News Agency. "ASEAN Study Sheds New Light on Women, Peace and Security Stature in Southeast 
Asia." Vietnam News Agency, March 9, 2021, https://en.vietnamplus.vn/asean-study-sheds-new-light-on-women-
peace-and-security-stature-in-southeast-asia/197295.vnp. 
37 Avdeyeva, O. "Does Reputation Matter for States’ Compliance with International Treaties? States Enforcement of 
Anti-Trafficking Norms." The International Journal of Human Rights 16, no. 2 (2012): 298-320. 
38 Shepherd, Laura J. and Jacqui True. "The Women, Peace and Security Agenda and Australian Leadership in the 





group membership alone does not result in compliance.39 Since UNSCR 1325 is non-binding, 
countries must view a direct connection between the norm and group membership for this theory 
to hold. International group dynamics are difficult to measure, so it is likely that these factors are 
most helpful for case studies rather than an analysis of norm adoption trends.  
Domestic Drivers 
From empirical research on gender rights norms emerges four main factors that facilitate 
compliance with gender equality norms: national policy interests, political representation, civil 
society activism, and domestic norms.  
1. National Policy Interests 
States use national policy interests to justify the initial adoption of the norm and to justify 
their level of commitment to compliance. Policy interests emerge from high-context processes 
that are specific to each country. Shepherd and True found that the Australian government 
implemented its NAP to gain more influence in the UNSC, a bipartisan foreign policy 
objective.40 In a similar case study, Motoyama found that the Japanese government passed its 
NAP in an attempt to overwrite its imperial history of violence and abuse against women during 
WWII.41 Japanese officials emphasized the policy in hopes of offsetting domestic backlash 
against a greater role of the military in its foreign policy. Countries also adjust their NAPs to 
appear compliant and maintain a positive international reputation yet still preserve their sense of 
sovereignty. For example, most ASEAN countries have not fully implemented UNSCR 1325 
because of concerns that a NAP invites foreign scrutiny and interference in domestic affairs.42 
 
39 True, “Explaining the Global.” 
40 Shepherd and True, "The Women,” 257-258. 
41 Motoyama, Hisako. "Formulating Japan’s UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan and Forgetting the “Comfort 
Women”." International Feminist Journal of Politics 20, no. 1 (2018): 39-53.  





While policy interests do affect whether a government adopts a norm, there are likely antecedent 
variables that create a “culture match” between existing national policies and emerging 
international norms. Therefore, national policy interests may be most useful for specific case 
studies rather than a global analysis.   
2. Political Representation of Women      
There is no consensus about the influence of female political representation on 
compliance with gender equality norms. Several studies have found a relationship between the 
number of women in government service and the creation of policies regarding gender rights 
norms.43 Some researchers argue that women in political structures are important only in 
combination with other factors, such as an organized civil society organization or a prevalence of 
female technocrats within the bureaucracy.44 However, others concluded that the number of 
female legislators is insignificant in comparison to other factors like government effectiveness 
and world culture ties.45 This disagreement could stem from differing datasets, the other 
variables used in the multivariate analyses, or the various definitions of female political 
representation. As there is no consensus, the topic requires further research. Since one of the 
main components of UNSCR 1325 is gender mainstreaming within political institutions, female 
political representation could plausibly affect a government’s willingness to comply. 
 
43 Larsen, "Benefits of a National,” 32-41; Schonhofer, “Political Determinants”; Avdeyeva, “Does Reputation”; 
True, “Explaining the Global.” 
44Guerrina, Roberta, Laura Chappell, and Katharine A. M. Wright. "Transforming CSDP? Feminist Triangles and 
Gender Regimes." Journal of Common Market Studies 56, no. 5 (2018). 
45 Amahazion, Fikre. “Human Trafficking: The Need for Human Rights and Government Effectiveness in Enforcing 





3. Domestic and Transnational Activism 
Many researchers agree that civil society organizations and activist networks are 
important for implementing norms, although there are disagreements regarding the direction of 
their effect. Activist networks are purported to create domestic narratives that welcome 
international norms.46 However, transnational advocacy networks can also undermine the 
implementation of norms, such that “states with fewer [emphasis added] domestic connections to 
transnational activist women’s organizing are more likely to adopt [the norm],” according to 
Hughes, Krook, and Paxton.47 Competing priorities and voices can undermine the solidarity of a 
movement. In some cases, a government may believe that minority activist groups threaten the 
existing political balance and therefore may be unwilling to implement the demanded change.48 
Therefore, the role of activist networks in norm diffusion appears to be highly nuanced. If 
activist networks affect norm compliance at all, the relationship could be positive or negative 
depending on country context. 
4. Domestic Norms 
Domestic norms are often examined in relation to norm compliance, but much of the 
research has not explained which domestic norms are important, or under which circumstances 
they influence diffusion. One study found that women’s suffrage competed with patriarchal 
norms for almost 80 years before the norm reached an international tipping point.49 Some authors 
have hypothesized that a country’s commitment to gender equality and its cultural views toward 
 
46 Zwingel, “How do Norms,” 121. 
47 Hughes, Melanie M., Mona Lena Krook, and Pamela Paxton. "Transnational Women's Activism and the Global 
Diffusion of Gender Quotas." International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 2 (2015): 358. 
48 Hughes et al, “Transnational Women’s,” 358-359. 





women could affect the probability that countries will pass NAPs.50 The WPS agenda may face 
specific resistance that cannot be compared to other gender equality initiatives, since male bias is 
entrenched in security and defense professions.51 Furthermore, gender equality may be a function 
of broader norms, such as democracy or commitment to human rights.52  
Notably, True quantitatively analyzed how conflict, democracy, and women in political 
power affected the diffusion of UNSCR 1325 NAPs.53 She found that democratic countries are 
more likely to implement a NAP than their less-democratic counterparts.54 The number of 
women in a country’s parliament is also a significant factor in predicting the likelihood that a 
NAP will be created, whereas a country’s conflict status and membership in the UNSC does not 
significantly affect the probability of NAP adoption. This research could be strengthened by 
replication that considers other variables that have been found to be influential in the diffusion of 
norms, such as the presence of transnational activist networks. Furthermore, the use of bivariate 
and multivariate regressions could strengthen the validity of True’s findings. Of course, such 
tests cannot account for high-context variables like national policy interests, but they can provide 
an overview of the norm landscape and provide reference for future case studies regarding 
UNSCR 1325.  
 Framework and Gaps for the Present Research 
The norm life cycle model provides a framework for studying differences in domestic 
factors that influenced countries to create a NAP. This model also accounts for the domestic, 
 
50 True, “Explaining the Global,” 314; Larsen, “Benefits of a National,” 36; Davies, Nackers, and Teitt, “Women, 
Peace.” 
51 Larsen, “Benefits of a National,” 35. 
52 True, “Explaining the Global,” 316. 
53 True, “Explaining the Global.” 





transnational, and international influences and actors that are considered in the boomerang and 
universal models. The present study will address gaps in previous literature by applying 
quantitative analyses to variables that have not yet been studied in relation to UNSCR 1325 
implementation, including gender inequality scores and international embeddedness. Applying 
these results to the approximate stages of the norm life cycle model could provide deeper insight 
into which countries are the norm leaders and why some countries have not yet created a NAP. 
This study hypothesizes that gender inequality scores will be lower among countries that passed 
their NAPs during or after the tipping point in 2010, in contrast with higher scores in countries 
that passed an NAP after 2010, and in countries that still do not have one in effect. Findings from 
this investigation will contribute to knowledge of compliance with UNSCR 1325, as well as 
strengthen empirical evidence regarding state compliance with international agreements. 
Testing the Effect of Gender Inequality on NAP Creation 
Hypotheses 
This study hypothesizes that the level of gender inequality in a country has a significant 
negative impact on the likelihood of that country to create a NAP. This has not been tested 
before, although it is informed by previous literature. Guiding this hypothesis is the concept of 
“cultural match,” the idea that states are more likely to implement international norms that 
already align with domestic norms.55 Since UNSCR 1325 is focused on promoting gender 
equality within peace and security institutions, widespread equality in society at large could 
create an environment that facilitates those objectives. In her study, True tested whether previous 
ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
 





Women (CEDAW) affected the probability that states would create a NAP.56 She found no 
significant overlap between countries that ratified CEDAW and countries that created a NAP. In 
her discussion, she posited that ratification of a separate agreement might not affect the 
probability of creating a NAP, but underlying commitments to gender equality could. This paper 
aims to test this hypothesis. 
H0: In a comparison of countries, there is no relationship between gender inequality   
levels and NAP creation. 
H1: In a comparison of countries, gender inequality levels negatively affect NAP 
creation, such that countries with high levels of gender inequality are less likely to create 
a NAP. 
Testing the relationship between gender inequality and NAP creation could reveal 
important findings about the potential impact of UNSCR 1325. If gender inequality is high in 
countries without a NAP, then other norms may need to diffuse to those countries first, causing 
the WPS agenda to not be consistently implemented across every country. If there is no 
difference in gender inequality between NAP adopters and non-adopters, then the culture match 
argument may be outweighed by other factors in the diffusion of UNSCR 1325. Regardless of 
the outcome, it will inform current NAP countries, WPS activists, and regional groups with 
action plans about the commonalities among countries that do not have NAPs. Outliers or 
unexpected results could also provide reference for future case studies on why a certain country 
did or did not create a NAP. Understanding why countries are reluctant or unable to pass NAPs 
 





could inform future efforts to diffuse the WPS norm, which would have far-reaching 
implications for future peace negotiations, UN peacekeeping efforts, and conflict interventions.  
In recognition that gender inequality is likely not the only factor that affects the 
probability of NAP creation, two control variables will also be tested. First, the level of 
democratization of a given country could affect its intention to implement an international norm 
regarding gender representation in highly political and traditionally male roles. True found a 
significant difference in democratization between NAP adopters and non-adopters, such that 
adopters exhibited higher levels of democratization than non-adopters.57 She argued that 
democracies are more likely to implement NAPs than non-democracies because of the 
transparency, openness, and public political participation that characterizes democratic societies. 
In her analysis, she emphasized the role of civil society groups in promoting NAPs since such 
groups have more operational freedom in democracies than non-democracies. 
It is also important to consider the relationship between gender inequality and democracy 
and why it is difficult to consider one without the other. Previous literature contends that 
democracy and gender inequality are self-reinforcing and that both are necessary but not 
sufficient for the other. For example, Cho found that higher levels of democracy can facilitate 
social equality, but does not guarantee an improvement in women’s political or economic rights 
on its own.58 Beer found that women’s equality is likely to increase when a country practices 
democracy and women’s suffrage for decades, which suggests that there is a potential difference 
in gender inequality between newer democracies and older democracies.59 Likewise, increased 
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political representation of women can strengthen a democracy by building inclusive perspectives 
and increasing domestic stability.60 Therefore, this study expects that both gender equality levels 
and democracy levels play a positive role in NAP creation. Democratic countries, then, are more 
likely to have a NAP than autocratic countries, and countries with stronger democracies are more 
likely to have a NAP than countries with weaker democracies. 
H2: In a comparison of countries, democratization positively affects NAP creation, such 
that countries with higher levels of democracy are more likely to create NAPs than 
countries with lower levels of democracy. 
Finally, the extent to which a country is embedded in world culture is another variable 
that may significantly influence gender equality and NAP creation. Several researchers have 
noted that socialization and acculturation can play a significant role in the diffusion of 
international norms.61 International networks and relations with the international community can 
increase a country’s exposure to ideas, information, norms, and patterns of behavior, therefore 
increasing its likelihood of adopting international culture. Furthermore, ties to developed 
countries may increase the likelihood of developing countries to create NAPs since many NAPs 
in developing countries were funded by Official Development Assistance.62 This could diminish 
the role of democracy in influencing the likelihood of NAP creation since donor countries 
provide aid and support to many developing countries that are weak or pseudo-democracies. 
Pressure from wealthier, more powerful countries, and perhaps even international non-
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governmental organizations (NGOs), may be quite influential in overriding the national agendas 
of weaker countries.  
H3: In a comparison of countries, embeddedness in world culture positively affects NAP 
creation, such that countries with more ties to the international community are more 
likely to create NAPs than countries that have fewer ties to the international community. 





These variables are not exhaustive, and there may be additional variables that impact the 
likelihood of the creation of NAPs. For example, a country’s wealth or access to resources or 
level of commitment to other relevant norms, such as sovereignty, might affect a country’s 
willingness to implement an unenforceable agreement. The present combination of factors may 
also inadvertently measure other variables, such as geographic proximity to the West or level of 
development. It could also be that many countries that have not passed a NAP have simply not 
yet passed a NAP and may one day do so. Nevertheless, the question still stands why some 
countries appear more reluctant than others to create a NAP, with less than half of all UNSC 
members with NAPs over 20 years after the passage of UNSC 1325. Though the present study 
does not account for many variables that also deserve merit in this conversation, it offers a viable 














Data and Methods 
Dependent variable 
Compliance with UNSCR 1325 will be measured by whether a UN Member State has a 
NAP in 2020, as this has been the standard for measuring compliance in previous studies. This 
data is available through non-governmental organizations that monitor the passage and quality of 
countries’ NAPs.63 Notably, this data offers an overview of the trends in NAP creation across all 
UN member states. It is coded as a dummy variable, with 0 signifying no NAP and 1 signifying a 
NAP in 2020.  At the end of 2020, 89 UN member states had NAPs while 104 did not. As 
illustrated by Figure 1, nearly all countries in Europe have passed a NAP while most countries in 
Asia have not. Even some countries that have experienced humanitarian crises and conflict in 
recent years have passed NAPs, including Yemen, Myanmar, and Sudan. Furthermore, despite 
the overall lack of NAPs in Asia, there are NAPs in nearly every region of the world, not just in 
the West.  
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     Figure 2 supports the claim by other authors that 2010 was the tipping point for UNSCR 1325 
as 11 countries passed a NAP that year, a number that was reached again in 2017. NAPs have 
been passed every year since 2005. Denmark was the first country to pass a NAP in 2005, 
followed by many countries in northern and western Europe in 2006 and 2007. In 2008, the Ivory 
Coast and Uganda were the first African countries to pass a NAP, while Chile broke the South 
American barrier in 2009. In the landmark year of 2010, the Philippines became the first Asian 
country to create a NAP, while the US did not pass its NAP until 2011. The most recent 
countries to create NAPs were Sudan, South Africa, Slovakia, Malta, and Latvia in 2020.      




      
 
Independent variables 
There are three independent variables in this study. First, the UN Gender Inequality Index 
(GII) will operationalize gender inequality. The GII, calculated as part of the annual Human 
Development Index (HDI), measures the disparities between men and women in three categories: 
reproductive health, political empowerment, and labor market participation.64 The first category 
is a measure of the maternal mortality ratio and the adolescent birth rate, two aspects of health 
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Figure 2: Number of NAPs Passed per Year





specific to women. Empowerment is measured in terms of education and political representation. 
Education is operationalized by comparing the number of men and women with a secondary 
education or higher, while political representation is measured by the number of men and women 
with seats in parliament. Finally, labor market participation compares the participation rates of 
men and women to approximate a measure of economic enablement.  
GII data is available for every five years from 1995 to 2010 and for every year from 2010 
to 2019.65 Scores are calculated on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no disparity between 
men and women and 1 indicating extremely high disparity between men and women. In 2018, 
gender inequality correlated with development, such that countries with very high human 
development (HDI scores of .800 and above) averaged 0.175 in gender inequality, while 
countries with low human development (HDI scores of .550 and below) averaged 0.590 in 
gender inequality.66 The world average gender inequality score was 0.439. Developing countries 
scored an average of 0.466, while country members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development scored an average of 0.182. Scores also vary by region, with Europe 
and Central Asia scoring 0.276 in 2018 while South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Arab states 
scored above 0.5. East Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean scored in the 
middle around 0.3. 
There are drawbacks to using an aggregated dataset. The GII incorporates a wide range of 
variables, which can obfuscate what is really being measured. One example is the dimension of 
reproductive health, measured by maternal mortality ratios and adolescent birth ratios. It is 
possible that maternal mortality ratios are dependent on national or individual wealth rather than 
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systemic discrimination against women; greater wealth at the national level could provide better 
healthcare infrastructure and personal wealth would provide the ability to afford it. To a certain 
extent, this might be true. However, gender inequality is not captured by a single dimension, and 
reproductive health statistics may capture the relative importance of childbearing— a role 
specific to women—in each society. For example, the maternal mortality ratio in the US in 2020 
was 19 deaths per 100,000 live births.67 The average maternal mortality ratio in all highly 
developed countries was 14; to compare, Sweden’s ratio was 4 and the United Kingdom’s ratio 
was 7 deaths per 100,000 live births. This difference may seem negligible, but it could affect 
how a country prioritizes women’s health needs in refugee camps or post-conflict zones. UNSCR 
1325 emphasizes including women’s perspectives and needs in all dimensions, not just economic 
and political ones, and especially in situations when women are vulnerable to sexual abuse, rape, 
and gender-specific causes of death. Moreover, both governments and NGOs affect reproductive 
health statistics through funding and health programs. These statistics, then, might provide a 
perspective on gender inequality that draws from a segment of society that is broader than just 
the government.  
 The GII is also limited in that it cannot account for additional factors that likely 
contribute to gender inequality. Moreover, the data is collected, and the index is calculated by the 
UN, which introduces the possibility of institutional bias into the operationalization of gender 
inequality. As a result of these limitations, this dataset may measure Westernization more 
accurately than it does gender inequality. Even so, no dataset is complete and there will always 
be alternate ways to measure gender inequality. This index offers a broad overview of several 
valid variables across social, political, and economic realms, and it builds on True’s finding that 
 





the proportion of women in parliament impacts NAP compliance.68 The shortfalls noted above 
do not significantly reduce the validity and reliability of the dataset, but they should be 
considered when interpreting results of the analysis. 
The second independent variable is democratization, which will be operationalized by the 
Polity 5 Annual Timeseries, a dataset produced by the Center for Systemic Peace that categorizes 
regime characteristics on a spectrum from authoritarian to democratic.69 Countries are evaluated 
according to the way in which executive leaders come into office, government constraints on 
executive authority, and the freedom of political competition. Based on these factors, countries 
are assigned a score on both a democratic index and an authoritarian index. Notably, True used 
only the democratic index in her analysis of NAP compliance. This study will use the total 
spectrum index in which countries are ranked on a scale from -10 to +10, with -10 signifying a 
hereditary monarchy and +10 signifying a consolidated democracy. The authors of the dataset 
note that this dataset is useful for aggregate investigative research but does not substitute in-
depth, qualitative research. Using the full spectrum of regime types to analyze NAP 
implementation will expand our understanding of how well both democratic and non-democratic 
governments have complied with UNSCR 1325. 
The final independent variable for consideration is international embeddedness. Previous 
researchers have operationalized this variable by using the Yearbook of International 
Organizations to identify how many international NGOs are registered in each country.70 This 
has been accepted as an indicator of international embeddedness because of the transnational 
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activist ties that exist between countries as a result of international organizations. However, this 
operationalization may be measuring democracy instead of international ties because the 
operation of international non-government organizations relies on domestic freedoms that may 
not be afforded by non-democratic governments. Furthermore, not all democracies are similar, 
and many may be too weak to enforce the rule of law that protects the operations of international 
organizations.  
Another option for operationalizing international embeddedness is measuring the level of 
political globalization within each country. Globalization is the process of increasing the 
interconnectedness of goods, information, and people between countries. The KOF Globalization 
Index compiles data on the economic, social, and political aspects of globalization and assigns 
globalization scores to countries on a scale from 1 to 100, with 100 indicating a highly 
globalized country.71 One of the variables in this index, de facto political globalization, measures 
the number of international NGOs operating within a country, the number of current UN 
peacekeepers from that country, and the number of embassies in the country.72 This accounts for 
the conventional method of measuring transnational activism, while also measuring the 
connections of countries to international interests.  
 Methods 
The sample for this study will be all UN member states for which data is available. 2018 
is the last year with available data for every variable, making the sample size 131 countries. 62 
countries from that sample, 47%, have NAPs, so this proportion of compliance is similar to the 
proportion of compliance in the total population in 2020. However, the proportion of compliance 
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represented by the data for 2018 is slightly higher than the actual proportion of compliance in 
2018 because most of the missing data is for non-NAP countries. The over-representation of 
NAP countries could skew the results. Examining data from a single year also does not account 
for change over time, which means any relationship between gender inequality and NAP creation 
found in this study is specific to this data and timeframe.73  
To establish significance in the relationship between gender inequality and NAP creation, 
chi-squared tests will be conducted as a first step. This test will determine if there is a significant 
difference between the average level of gender inequality in countries that have NAPs versus 
countries that do not. The second chi-squared test will determine whether there is a difference in 
the level of gender inequality depending on the year when a country passed its NAP. It is 
expected that countries that passed their NAPs after the tipping point will have higher levels of 
gender inequality than countries that were among the first to create NAPs. Finally, a logistic 
regression analysis will determine how significantly gender inequality affects the probability that 
a country passes a NAP, if at all. This test will also account for the confounding variables 
described earlier in this section.  
Data Analysis 
To determine a baseline difference in countries with NAPs versus countries without 
NAPs, a chi-squared test shows the breakdown of gender inequality levels by NAP creation. The 
NAP was coded as a dummy variable, with “0” or “No” indicating that the country did not have 
a NAP and “1” or “Yes” indicating that a country did have a NAP. The GII was transformed into 
five groups to categorize the data according to “very low,” “low,” “medium,” “high,” and “very 
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high” gender inequality levels.74 The chi-squared value of 22.71 indicates that there is a 
difference between the expected and observed values of the data, while the p-value of 0.000 
indicates that this relationship is significant and unlikely to be due to chance.  
Countries with very low gender inequality levels had the highest proportion of 
compliance at 84%, while countries with medium levels of gender inequality had the lowest rate 
of compliance at about 23%. Notably, countries with low gender equality had similar proportions 
of compliance to countries with very high levels of gender equality. In fact, there was a higher 
rate of compliance among countries with very high levels of gender inequality than among 
countries with medium or high gender inequality. In sum, only countries with very low or very 
high levels of gender inequality were more likely to have a NAP than to not have a NAP. 
Table 1: Chi-Squared Test Between NAP Status and Gender Inequality Level (Column 
Percentages) 
 GII Level 
NAP Very Low Low Medium High Very High Total 
No 16.00 51.85 76.92 69.23 48.15 52.67 
Yes 84.00 48.15 23.08 30.77 51.85 47.33 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Pearson chi2(4) = 22.7095 | Pr = 0.000     
To further investigate this relationship, the connection between gender inequality levels 
and the year of NAP passage was examined. A scatterplot between the 2018 GII scores of NAP 
adopters and the years when countries passed their NAPs shows a very weak correlation between 
the two variables. From 2005 to 2007, countries that passed a NAP had GII levels of less than .2, 
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meaning that they had low levels of gender inequality. This indicates a weak, positive, linear 
relationship, but after 2007 this relationship no longer holds. In 2008, both countries with GII 
levels over .5 and countries will GII levels under .1 passed NAPs. However, it does appear that 
the minimum GII score increased by a marginal amount over time, which could support the 
hypothesis that countries with higher gender inequality levels will pass NAPs later than countries 
with lower gender inequality levels. It also appears that countries of similar gender inequality 
levels passed NAPs around the same time, with clusters appearing in 2010, 2012, 2017, and 
2018.  
 
A chi-squared test revealed that there is a significant difference in the years when 
countries of different GII levels passed their NAPs (Table 2). For this test, the NAP passage 
years were sorted into four groups from 2005 to 2009; 2010 to 2011; 2012 to 2015; and 2016 to 
2018. These groups were created to have similar numbers of countries; since 2010 was the 





every other grouping. GII groups again sorted as “very low,” “low,” “medium,” “high,” and 
“very high.” The chi-squared value of 27.2432 indicated that there was a difference between the 
expected and observed values, and the p-value of 0.007 indicated that this relationship is unlikely 
to be due to chance.  
Consistent with the scatterplot, over half of the countries that passed NAPs with a very 
low level of gender inequality passed them between 2005 and 2009. Countries with low gender 
inequality mostly passed NAPs during the 2016 to 2018 period, but did have the highest group 
proportion of 2010 to 2011. Medium inequality countries were most likely to pass their NAPs 
during 2012 to 2015, while high and very high inequality countries were most likely to pass their 
NAPs after 2012. These results only partially support the hypothesis because medium, high, and 
very high inequality countries were likely to pass NAPs after very low inequality countries, but 
low inequality countries were most likely to pass NAPs after countries with medium inequality 
or higher. 
 Table 2: Chi-Squared Calculation of NAP Passage Year by Gender Inequality 
Level 
                          GII Level 
NAP Very Low Low Medium High Very High Total 
2005-2009 52.38 7.69 16.67 0.00 14.29 25.00 
2010-2011 28.57 30.77 0.00 25.00 14.29 23.53 
2012-2015 14.29 7.69 50.00 37.50 42.86 26.47 
2016-2018 4.76 53.85 33.33 37.50 28.57 25.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  





While chi-squared tests established significance, a logistic regression describes the 
relationship between the variables. A bivariate logistic regression analysis of the relationship 
between GII scores and the probability that a country creates a NAP yielded an equation of 
Log(p/1-p) = .716 – 2.46*GII (Table 3). In other words, a unit increase in the GII score reduces 
the log odds that a country has a NAP by -2.46; high gender inequality reduces the probability 
that a country creates a NAP. A z-score of -2.53 indicates that countries with NAPs have a mean 
GII score that is about 2.5 standard deviations below the mean, and the p-value of 0.011 is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Moreover, the probability of attaining the chi-squared 
value is also statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This appears to support the hypothesis that 
countries with NAPs have lower levels of gender inequality than countries that do not have 
NAPs. 
Table 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of NAP Creation Status by Gender Inequality Level  
  
NAP Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
GII Score -2.463619 .9743599 -2.53 0.011 -4.37333     -.5539089 
_cons .7160013 .3697158 1.94 0.053 -.0086283     1.440631 
Number of obs = 131 
LR chi2(1) = 6.71 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0096 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0370 
     
 
A multivariate logistic regression, however, reveals that the results of the bivariate 
regression may be misleading. When analyzed alongside globalization and democratization, the 
GII score does not significantly impact the log odds that a country has developed a NAP (Table 





0.232173*Globalization + .121551*Democracy. Still, both GII scores and globalization scores 
are insignificant at the 0.05 level, with respective p-values of 0.6 and 0.054. The z score for GII 
scores was also different at -0.52, which is much closer to the mean than the z score of the 
bivariate regression. Even so, democracy is a statistically significant independent variable; for 
every one-unit increase in democracy scores we expect a .121551 increase in the log-odds of the 
dependent variable NAP, holding all other independent variables constant. Furthermore, 
countries with NAPs have a democracy score that is over three standard deviations above the 
mean. This affirms previous findings that levels of democracy affect NAP creation.  
Table 4: Logistic Regression Analysis of NAP Creation Status by Gender Inequality 
Level, Globalization Score, and Democracy Score  
  
NAP Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
GII Score -.635591 1.21136 -0.52 0.600 -3.009812     1.73863 
Globalization 0.232173 .012049 1.93 0.054 -.0003983     .046833 
Democracy .121551 .0391206 3.11 0.002 .0448761     .1982258 
_cons -2.08992 1.124698 -1.86 0.063 -4.294287     .1144466 
Number of obs = 130 
LR chi2(1) = 25.11 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1395 
     
 
Discussion of Results and Implications 
Based on the results of this study, summarized in Table 5, the effect of gender inequality 
on UNSCR 1325 compliance appears indirect at most, so we do not reject the null hypothesis. 
Though there was a significant difference in gender inequality levels in countries with NAPs 
compared to countries without NAPs, the chi-squared tests and multivariate logistic regression 
provided evidence against the significance of that difference. The strongest correlation between a 





levels of gender inequality and the very lowest levels of gender inequality. Gender inequality 
levels also did not affect the timing of NAP creation except perhaps in countries with the very 
lowest levels of gender inequality. This suggests that the actual relationship between gender 
inequality and NAP compliance could be conditional, such that domestic norms matter for 
agreement compliance before the norm tipping point, but less so afterwards.  
 
The third hypothesis regarding globalization is also rejected, although the role of 
globalization should not be discounted in future studies. Because of time restrictions, tests on the 
relationship between globalization and gender inequality were limited. International 
embeddedness was insignificant in the multivariate regression, and a disaggregated analysis 
could reveal if certain aspects of political globalization are more influential than others on NAP 
Table 5: Summary of Hypothesis, Methods, and Results 
Hypothesis Method(s) of 
Analysis 
Results 
H0: There is no 
significant relationship 
between gender 
inequality and NAP 
creation. 
 
H1: Gender inequality 








▪ Only countries with very low and very 
high gender inequality were more likely 
to have a NAP, contradicting H1;  
▪ Only countries with very low inequality 
were more likely to pass their NAPs first, 
partially consistent with H1;  
▪ Gender inequality had an insignificant 
impact on NAP creation when analyzed 









▪ Democratization had a slight but 
significant positive effect on the 
likelihood of NAP creation, consistent 
with H2. 
 
H3: Embeddedness in 
world culture positively 
affects NAP creation. 
Multivariate 
logistic regression 
▪ There was no significant effect of 
embeddedness on the likelihood of NAP 






creation. It could also be that the measurements of international embeddedness used in this 
study—the numbers of international non-governmental organizations, embassies, and deployed 
peacekeepers of each country—are best studied case by case within the context of domestic 
policies toward international involvement. These findings could also potentially support 
observations that transnational networks can have both a positive and negative effect on norm 
compliance, but, in this case, there is neither a strong positive nor a strong negative relationship 
between de facto political globalization and NAP creation. 
Finally, we do not reject the second hypothesis since the multivariate regression 
demonstrated that democratization had a significant impact on the log odds of a positive outcome 
in the dependent variable. Democracy could provide a stronger domestic cultural match for 
international agreements than gender equality norms, although this study did not investigate the 
relationship between democracy and gender equality. The significance of democracy in this 
study affirms similar findings from other researchers, and future projects could investigate the 
aspects of democratic regimes that increase the probability that they adopt a NAP. It is possible 
that democracies are more likely to comply with UN agreements in general, or perhaps 
democracies normalize female political leadership and inclusion in a way that non-democracies 
do not, even if non-democracies have a relatively low level of gender inequality. It is possible 
that the universal human rights norm, commonly found in democracies, is more influential than 
domestic gender norms; a country’s commitment to broad human rights might be a tide that 
raises all ships, leading to more favorable political conditions for women.  This affirms theories 
of a “cultural match” between democracies and value-based agreements; perhaps countries that 
have high levels of inequality yet also have a NAP are relatively new democracies moving 





Several factors could negatively impact the validity of these results. While 130 
observations constitute a respectable sample size that meets the threshold for the analysis 
conducted, missing data reduced the ability of the dataset to represent the actual population. 
Complete datasets for all UN member states would provide more robust results that may vary. 
There could also be other intervening or confounding variables that were not included in this 
study. Levels of economic and social development, different measures of transnational 
interconnectedness, and government budgets are just a few examples of other variables that 
could plausibly affect UNSCR 1325 implementation. One other potentially confounding factor is 
the presence of non-NAP policies that contribute to the WPS norm. Perhaps countries with low 
gender inequality do have WPS-related policies that are not NAPs, which could make a NAP 
seem redundant and unnecessary. Since these types of policies are not standardized like NAPs, a 
qualitative case study would be the best way to consider their effect on Resolution 1325 non-
compliance. 
Disaggregated analysis could also yield different results. The concepts that this study 
used could be operationalized with a variety of other datasets and definitions. For example, the 
results of the multivariate analysis may add nuance to True’s finding that female political 
representation positively affects NAP creation because female political representation is included 
as a measure of the GII. Without a disaggregated analysis, it cannot be determined that these 
results directly contradict True’s conclusion. Future research could disaggregate the GII and 
compare the effects of female political representation, economic empowerment, and access to 
healthcare on NAP creation.  
Lastly, the dichotomous dependent variable limited the type of insight statistical testing 





quality of NAPs across time, any research on the trends in implementation will be limited in 
nuance and explanatory power. There are prospects for such a dataset as the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom continues to expand its annual WPS Scorecard for 
assessing UNSC members.75 Until such a dataset is available, exploratory quantitative analyses 
must be supplemented with in-depth, qualitative investigations. Such studies could focus on the 
differences between a small number of NAP and non-NAP countries, especially those within the 
same multilateral organizations. 
Despite these drawbacks, the findings in this study build upon previous literature and 
have important implications regarding compliance with UNSCR 1325. Although the main 
hypothesis was rejected, the results of the tabulations support the norm life cycle theory. Before 
the tipping point in 2010, most of the countries that had adopted NAPs had low levels of gender 
inequality. Since low levels of gender inequality generally correlate with high levels of 
development, most of these countries were presumably highly influential and visible leaders. The 
first countries might also have implemented NAPs in part because of the cultural match between 
domestic gender equality values and the theme of Resolution 1325.  
Notably, the first countries to adopt NAPs were also Western donor countries. These 
governments might have pushed for the creation of NAPs in countries receiving humanitarian or 
economic aid, reducing the importance of domestic cultural match for agreement implementation 
after the tipping point. This could potentially explain why so many countries with high gender 
disparities have NAPs. For example, Afghanistan has a high level of gender inequality and a 
weak democratic culture but also a high level of influence from international organizations and 
 






donor states. Compliance might have also become a resource issue rather than one of values. 
Funding from developed countries and incentives in bilateral relations to create a NAP could 
influence national priorities, which would also explain why countries with the very highest levels 
of gender inequality are more likely than not to have a NAP. Countries with medium-range 
gender inequality likely did not attract pressure from the norm leaders, which could be why 
many of those states did not pass NAPs until later. 
With this possibility in mind, countries with low cultural precedent for gender integration 
and mainstreaming may not necessarily be resistant to UNSCR 1325. Rather, compliance could 
now be an issue of framing the costs and benefits of creating a NAP or a practical matter of 
funding and institutional competence. Perhaps the governments in countries without NAPs 
simply do not feel pressured or incentivized to create one. Democratization efforts may even 
indirectly affect UNSCR 1325 compliance over time by changing a government’s values and 
international social group. Even if every UN Member State eventually passes a NAP, further 
research must be conducted to determine how domestic norms matter —or begin to matter less—
during the diffusion of international norms. A better understanding of the interaction and 
exchange between domestic and international norms could change the way international norm 
leaders promote compliance with individual countries. 
Moreover, if domestic commitments to gender equality are not necessary for NAP 
implementation, efforts to integrate and mainstream women and gendered perspectives could be 
seriously undermined. Countries could create NAPs yet fail to sufficiently implement them, 
leading to a hollow WPS agenda. Mapping the trends of norm diffusion from compliance to 
implementation is important not just for UNSCR 1325 accountability, but for future international 





findings from this study to investigate if NAPs created after the tipping point have resulted in 
lower average levels of gender inequality, how domestic norms interact with international norms, 
and how relationships between developed and developing countries have influenced NAP 
creation and implementation. 
Conclusion 
UNSCR 1325 was a hallmark resolution that is now the cornerstone of the international 
WPS agenda, yet less than half of all UN member states have created NAPs. Put differently, this 
group of states represents a little less than 3 billion people, or about 38% of the world 
population.76 Some of the most populous states in the world, including China, India, and 
Pakistan, have yet to adopt a NAP. The gap in domestic diffusion could undermine the 
advancement of women’s rights and integration of women into decision-making roles in political 
and military institutions around the world. Without state compliance with UNSCR 1325, 
progress toward sustainable peace agreements, more stable societies, and the elimination of 
violence against women will be slowed. Therefore, NAPs are crucial for state security and 
human security alike, especially as some of the most populous parts of the world begin to face 
more frequent humanitarian disasters and instability. 
This study examined the broad, quantitative trends in the creation of NAPs, finding no 
significant relationship between the level of gender inequality in a country and the likelihood that 
a country has a NAP. Instead, the level of democratization of a country appeared to have a 
significant, positive effect on the likelihood of NAP creation. As a result of the self-reinforcing 
relationship between democracy and gender equality, democracy may be an important precursor 
 






for NAP creation and the diffusion of domestic gender rights. However, democracy by itself does 
not guarantee reduced gender inequality, which means that NAP creation is just the beginning of 
UNSCR 1325 compliance and not necessarily the culmination of a rise in political, social, and 
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